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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD E. ASHBY 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
WHITING & HAYMO,ND CO~N­
STRUCTION CO,MPANY, 
Defenda.nt and Appellant 
BRIEF Of APPELLANT 
Case No. 9953 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage arising out of a collision between a pickup truck 
driven by the plaintiff and an automobile driven by V erl 
Justesen. Justesen was not the employee or agent of the 
defendant Construction Company. He was not a party 
to the lawsuit. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. It held the defendant 
Construction Company liable for not replacing and main-
taining a stop sign located at the intersection where the 
accident occurred. From a judgment for the plaintiff, 
defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in its favor, as a matter of law, or that failing, a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts views the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It also in-
cludes the undisputed facts which favor the defendant. 
For the purpose of identification the court record will be 
referred to by HR" and the reporter's transcript by ((T". 
At about 6:30 p.m. on Saturday, O.ctober 29, 1960, 
the plaintiff was driving east in his 1955 Chevrolet pickup 
on Highway U 100 (First North Street) in Fillmore, Utah. 
(T9) The defendant construction company had been 
working on Highway U 100 since September 1, 1960. 
(T 12 3) . The project involved putting in a concrete ditch 
to act as a dit.ch and curb and gutter on the north side of 
the street, curb and gutter on the south side of the street, 
and resurfacing the road and intersections from curb to 
curb. (T 124). The defendant had taken down andre-
placed the stop signs in order to complete the project. The 
plaintiff had driven to work on Highway U 100 when-
ever it was open. (T 44) He had noticed the stop signs 
were down at the intersection of Highway U 100 and 
First, Second and Third West, except for the one on the 
south side of Third West (T 43). He had seen equip-
ment working in the area where the stop signs were (T 
43). The plaintiff was driving with his lights on high 
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beam then dimmed his lights for another vehicle coming 
west on Highway U 100. (T 51). As the plaintiff ap-
proached the intersection of Highway U 100 and Second 
West he passed the vehicle going west. (T 10) When 
the plaintiff entered the intersection of Highway U 100 
and Second West he did not remember that he looked to 
the north. (T 49) 
Q. That's what I am saying is, you were looking 
straight ahead? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As you were going east and you did not look to 
to the north? 
A. No, not that I remember. 
Q. Not that you can remember? 
A. No. (T 48) 
Plaintiff did not remember seeing anything before 
the impact. (T 11). His vehicle was struck on the left side 
by an automobile driven by Veri Justesen. (T 87) Jus-
tesen was proceeding south on Second West when he en-
tered the intersection of Second West and Highway U 100 
and struck the plaintiff's pickup between the cab and 
the back fender (T 87). The pickup truck was rolled 
over, the fenders and the bed were bent and the glass was 
broken by the force of the impact. The front end of the 
Plymouth driven by Justesen was all smashed. (T 87). 
Tztstesen told Fillmore police officer, Merlin Hare, he ~vas 
going 40 m.p.h. when he entered the intersection. (T. 90) 
Justesen also told Officer Hare he had been drinking prior 
to the collision. (T 97) 
The automobile driven by Justesen left 25 feet of skid 
marks commencing just south of the cross walk on the 
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north side of the intersection of Highway U 100 and 
Second West Street and continuing up to the point of 
impact. The officer measured an additional 3 0 feet of 
skid marks from the point of impact to where the Justesen 
vehicle finally came to a rest. ( T 8 8, 91 ) 
There were no skid marks left by the plaintiff's truck 
before the impact. (T 8 8) • The pickup truck skided 3 3 
feet after the impact, then rolled over 50 feet before it 
came to a rest. (T 95). 
Verl Justesen had been driving a milk truck up and 
down Highway U 100 every day for a period of time prior 
to th'e accident. Officer Hare testified: 
Q. You were acquainted with him (Veri Justesen) 
at the time of this accident? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you know of your own knowledge that 
he had been driving a truck up and down High-
way U 100 prior to this accident? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did he tell you for whom? 
A. Floyd Killis' milk route. 
Q. Did he have occasion because of his employ-
ment to drive this street every day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was for a period of time before the acci-
dent occurred? 
A. Yes. Yes, that was prior to the accident. 
Q. About how long had he lived in Fillmore prior 
to this accident? 
A. Well, I don't know for sure but I'd say at least 
two or three years he had been in the area. 
Q. Your testimony would be, then, that to the 
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best of your knowledge, he traveled this street 
during the period of construction? 
A. Yes. (T 98) 
Grant Palfreyman, construction foreman for defend-
ant testified that when the construction crew moved into 
the area of Second West and Highway U 100, the stop 
sign on the Northwest corner of the intersection was 
down. (T 125). 
Each evening when the construction crew left the 
area, Mr. Palfreyman propped the stop sign against a 
uconstruction horse" and pla,ced it at the Northwest 
corner of the intersection. (T 126-128) 
Mr. Palfreyman testified the construction horse was 
painted a safety yellow with reflectorized stripes which 
were either red and white or black and white. There was 
also a ttslow" sign approximately 2 foot square bolted to 
the construction horse. (T 128) 
During the day when the defendant's construction 
crew was working, the construction horse and stop sign 
were moved out of working area. (T 126) 
It is undisputed that when Defendant's crew left 
the job site em the evening of FrNlay, October 28, 1960, 
the stop sign was rr toe-nailed" to a construction horse and 
set on the nortbwest corner of the intersection of Highway 
U 100 and Second West street. (T 126-127) 
With regard to where the construction horse was 
placed on the evening of October 28, 1960, Mr. Palfrey-
man testified: 
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nQ. And now, could you tell us approximately 
where that sign was placed by yourself on that 
night? 
A. Approximately at the edge of the old cross walk 
because we didn't have the oil laid out from the 
intersection at that time. The oil was laid in a 
strip about 60 feet wide down through the center 
of the road from Highway 91 down to approxim-
ately Fifth West. 
Q. And is it your recollection that the sign was 
close to the cross walk, the old cross walk that went 
across the street there? 
A. That's right." (T 128) 
Defendant's crew did not work on Saturday, October 29th 
the day the accident happened. (T 144) 
When defendant's crew returned to the job site on 
Monday, October 31st a police officer of Fillmore City 
rounded up a group of boys, had them get a tractor and 
a wagon and bring hack some of the construction signs 
which had been taken from the area. (T 127) One of the 
signs returned w·as the stop sign for the northwest corner 
of the intersection of Highway U 100 and Second West. 
(T 127) 
Trooper Gayle C. Rasmussen of the Utah Highway 
Patrol testified that the normal reaction time for a driver 
is one-half to three-fourths of a second, so that a driver 
going 40 m.p.h. would travel 30 to 45 feet from the time 
he observed the danger until he applied his brakes. (T 1 07). 
Trooper Rasmussen testified that the stop sign on 
t:he northwest corner of the intersection of Highway U 
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100 and Second West was laying on the ground near a 
mound of dirt after the accident (T 104). He also testi-
fied the stop sign had been down for several days prior 
to the accident. (T 105) 
Maxim P. Thornton, an employee of Fillmore City, 
testified the stop sign had been down most of the week 
before the accident. (T 66) Thornton did recall there 
zuere construction horses at the intersections of First, Sec-
ond and Third West and Highway U 100, but he could 
not recall whether he saw the construction horse· on Sat-
urday, October 29th or not. (T 69). 
Everett Ashman who resides in the house on the 
northwest corner of the intersection of Highway U 100 
and Second West Street testified the stop sign at that 
particular corner was down for about a week during the 
latter part of October. (T 79-80) He remembered seeing 
a rr construction-horse" by the culvert on the northwest 
corner of the intersection of Second West and Highway 
U 100 where the stop sign was. (T 80). 
Defendant was unable_ to locate Verl Justesen at the 
time of trial. He did not testify nor was he made a party 
to the action. (R-1) 
ARGU:MENT 
POINT I 
THE ABSENCE OF THE STOP SIGN (IF IT WAS 
ABSENT) WAS NOT A CAUSE OF THE COLLISION 
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Defendant respectfully submits that there is no evi-
dence in the record to support a finding that it was 
negligent. If the Court should hold the record does sup-
port such a finding, such negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the accident. The proximate cause of this acci-· 
dent was the negligence of Verl Justesen. 
The record conclusively shows that Justesen knew 
the area where the accident happened as he had been driv-
ing a milk truck up and down Highway U 100 every 
day for some time prior to the accident. O;fficer Merlin 
I-Iare testified that Justesen had traveled Highway U 100 
during the period of the construction and was familiar 
with the intersection. 
The testimony of O-fficer Hare on this point is un-
disputed. Justesen must be charged with the knowledge 
that the stop sign was removed the week before the acci-
dent so equipment coul~ work in the intersection, as he 
drove the street every day. Justesen knew he was ap-
proaching a state highway as he drove south on Second 
West Street. He knew he had the duty to yield the right 
of way to vehicles traveling on the state highway. 
The Utah Code Provides: 
~~vehicle entering a through highway.-The 
driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this act 
at the entrance to a through highway and shall 
yield the right of way to other vehicles which have 
entered the intersection from said through high-
way or which are approaching so closely on said 
through highway as to constitute an immediate 
hazard but said driver having so yielded may pro-
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ceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approach-
ing the intersection on said through highway shall 
yield the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding 
into or across the through highway." (U.C.A. 1953 
41-6-74) (Italics ours) 
If the stop sign had been up, it would not have given 
Justesen any more warning of the highway or of the 
plaintiff's vehicle than he already had. 
In Haarstrich v. Oregon Short LineR. Co. 70 Utah 
552, 262 Pac. 100, (Utah 1927) this court was con-
fronted with facts similar to the instant case. In that 
case the plaintiff a guest passenger in an automobile, 
claimed the defendant, railroad was negligent for failin1-{ 
to have proper signals at the crossing in North Salt Lake. 
The plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which 
she was riding collided with a freight train at the crossing 
around 1:15 a.m. The evidence disclosed that the driver 
of the automobile had a clear view of the train for 15 0 
feet or more yet he failed to see it until it was too late 
to avoid the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court reversed holding the negligence of the Railroad 
company in not complying with the law as to warnings 
and signals, was not a proximate cause of the accident. 
The question on appeal was whether the negligence 
of the defendant, if any, was a proximate cause of the 
injury sustained by the plaintiff. The court held it was 
not, stating: 
((The street lights were functioning, and there 
appears to have been no reason whatever why he 
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could not have stopped his car and avoided the 
collision if he had looked ahead and applied his 
brakes at the proper time. In view of the indubit-
able facts disclosed by the evidence, it is wholly 
immaterial whether the defendant strictly com-
plied with the law as to warnings and signals. Its 
failure in that regard, if there was a failure, which 
is very doubtful, had nothing whatever to do with 
the accident and was in no sense the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injury." (Italics ours) 
In the instant case, the fact that the stop sign was 
down has no bea·ring whatsoever on the cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. Justesen knew he was approaching a high-
way from a secondary road and he saw the plaintiff's 
vehicle on the highway. His negligence in failing to yield 
the right of way was the proximate cause of the accident. 
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 1 Utah 2d 143, 
263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953) this court announced the rule 
that where one has negligently created a dangerous con-
dition and a later actor observed or circumstances are 
such that he could not fail to observe such condtion, but 
negligently failed to avoid it, then as a matter of law the 
later intervening act interrupts the natural sequence of 
events and cuts off the legal effect of the negligence of 
the initial actor. 
In Tmna v. Utah Power f5 Light Co. 12 Utah 2d 278, 
365 P.2d 788 (Utah 1961); and Velasquez v. Greyhound 
Lines, 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 (Utah 1961), this 
court held that where the later actor knew of the condition 
created by the prior actor, but negligently failed to avoid 
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it, the negligence of the later actor cut off the prior negli-
gence and became the sole proximate cause of the ac-cident. 
In the Toma case an action was brought by the ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of Fred R. Shook, Jr. against 
the Utah Power & Light Company alleging Shook was 
killed because of the negligence of the defendant. With 
regard to the matter of proximate cause, the evidence 
proved that the deceased's employer knew that the defend-
ant's power lines were energized at the tim of the pouring 
of cement. The deceased's employer failed to take any 
acts to have the power cut off. Shook was electrocuted 
when a crane lowering a bucket into a truck he was driv-
ing, came into contact with a cchot" wire. 
This Court stated: 
ttExamining the facts of the case at bar in light 
of this case, we observe the Mountain States Con-
struction Company knew the involved wires were 
live at the time of the pouring of cement on the 
south side September 5, 1956. Mr. Waldren testi-
fied he had been told power would not be cut off. 
Thus, even though the Utah Power & Light Com-
pany had negligently created a dangerous situation, 
and negligently continued to maintain such a con-
dition by refusing to cut off the power, the Moun-
tain States Construction Company did have knowl-
edeg of such condition and failed to avoid the 
impending disaster. On the contrary the Mountain 
States Construction Company put into motion the 
actions which created the accident. It is not that 
the Mountain States Construction Company failed 
to observe a dangerous condition until too late to 
avoid it. In fact the Mountain States Construction 
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Company knew of the condition for four days." 
(Italics outs) 
* * * 
((While we attach no particular significance to 
the plaintiff's pull, we do believe and so hold, :f.rom 
plaintiff's own evidence, that as a matter of law 
the negligence of the Mountain States Construction 
Company as hereinbefore set out was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the accident. So holding, the judg-
ment of the District COurt is affirmed. Costs to 
respondent." 
A directed verdict in favor of the defendant was 
sustained by the Su prerne Court. 
In the Velasquez case supra, an a.ction was brought 
for injuries sustained by a passenger on a bus which col-
lided with the rear of a semi trailer stopped on the side 
of the highway. The action was brought against the bus 
company and the owner of the semi trailer. 
The evidence disclosed that the driver of the semi 
trailer stopped his truck at night to help another motorist 
with approximately 7 feet of the trailer protruding on 
to the traveled portion of an interstate highway. The 
truck's clearance lights, stop lights and blinker lights were 
on when the truck driver alighted. The Greyhound bus 
driver admitted he saw the truck as he· approached. He 
said he intended to stop behind the truck to render assist-
ance and to add the benefit of his lights to the scene. The 
evidence disclosed the bus driver lost consciousness by 
either falling to sleep or blacking out from some other 
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cause. He was aroused to consciousness by the cry of a 
woman passenger ((Don't hit it". He swerved the bus 
but not in time to avoid hitting the left rear comer of the 
tntck. 
The question on appeal was whether the negligence 
of Greyhound was the sole proximate cause of the injury 
or whether the prior par king of the truck so as to partially 
obstruct the lane of traffic was a concurring proximate 
cause of the collision. 
The court stated: 
ccln determining whether the negligence in creating 
a hazard (Interstate's parking the truck ) was 
aproximate cause of the collision, this is the test 
to be applied: did the wrongful act, in a natural 
and continuous sequence of events which might 
reasonably be expected to follow, produce the in-
jury. If so, it can be said to be a concurring proxi-
ate cause of the injury even though the later 
negligent act of another (Greyhound) cooperated 
to cause it. On the other hand, if the latter's act 
of negligence in causing the collision was of such 
character as not reasonably to be expected to 
happen in the natural sequence of events, then 
such later act of negligence is the independent, 
intervening cause and therefore the sole proximate 
cause of the injury. 
((Applying the foregoing test to our situation: we 
think it is not reasonably to be foreseen that an 
oncoming driver (Greyhound) would see (or fail 
to see) this large, well-lighted truck so parked 
upon the highway, and with at least one and one-
half usable traffic lanes to his left nevertheless run 
into it. The trial court was correct in so concluding 
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and entered a judgment in favor of Interstate 
Motor Lines as a matter of law on the ground that 
the negligence of Greyhound was the sole proxi-
mate cause of the collision." 
The fact that the Greyhound bus driver saw the 
truck then failed to avoid it resulted in his negligence being 
the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Defendant respectfully submits that these two recent 
Utah cases are persuasive authority that defendant's neg-
ligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of this accident 
Justesen knew that he was entering an intersection yet 
he failed to slow down or take any action to avoid the 
collision until it was too late. He admitted to Officer 
Hare that he was going 40 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. zone when 
he entered the intersection. Justesen's reckless conduct in 
racing into the intersection at 40 m.p.h. conclusively 
shows he had no intention of obeying any stop sign. To 
say that Justesen would have seen the stop sign and slowed 
down is to completely ignore the physical facts of this 
case. Such reasoning is based on pure speculation. Justesen 
saw the plaintiff's vehicle when he was at least 70 feet 
from the point of imp:act (T 106) If he had been driving 
at a reduced speed he could have brought his vehicle to 
a stop within a reasonable distance, and stopped before 
the impact. 
Justesen's own knowledge of the intersection, coup-
led with his actual knowledge of the plaintiff's vehicle 
on the highway gave him more warning than he would 
have received from the stop sign. He knew of the danger 
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then recklessly failed to avoid it. His conduct in speeding 
into the intersection was the sole proximate cause of this 
collision. It completely cuts off any prior negligence 
of this defendant. 
POINT II. 
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE SHOWS 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NO·T NEGLIGENT 
The undisputed testimony conclusively shows that 
on Friday evening October 28, 1960, when defendant's 
construction crew left the job on Highway U 100, that 
the stop sign was ((toe-nailed" to a construction horse and 
placed on the northwest corner of the intersection of High-
way U 100 and Second West Street. Defendant's evidence 
stands uncontradicted on this fact. 
Grant Palfreyman, defendant's construction foreman 
testified: 
Q. Now directing your attention to the last week-
end in October which was the weekend just before 
Halloween do you recall if on the night of Friday, 
October 28 what you did if anything with regard 
to the stop sign on the intersection on the north 
side of Second West and U-100? 
A. I put them all in place against these horse con-
struction barricades before I left the project. 
Q. When you put them against the construction 
horses, did you prop them up or nail them or what 
did you do with them? 
A. Sometimes toe-nailed them through the two 
by fours. (T 126-127) 
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There is no evidence which contradicts the fact that the 
stop sign was in place when the defendant's crew left the 
a·rea. 
It is elementary that the plaintiff cannot recover 
unless he can show that the defendant was negligent and 
that such negligence was a proximate cause of his injury. 
Mortensen v. First Securty Bank of Utah, 12 Utah 2d 89, 
363 P. 2d 75 (Utah 1961). 
The fact that the stop sign was seen down on the 
ground on Saturday evening O·ctober 29, some 24 hours 
after defendant left the area, is not evidence that the sign 
was left down on Friday evening O·ctober 28th. Mere 
proof of the existence of a present condition generally does 
not raise any presumption that the same condition existed 
at a prior date. 
The rule stated in 31 C.J.S. p 789 Sec. 140 relating 
to past and future existence of a fact or condition is as 
follows: 
HAs a general rule mere proof of the existence of 
a present condition or state of facts or proof of 
the existence of a condition or state of facts at a 
given time, does not raise any presumption that 
the same condition or facts existed at a prior date, 
since inferences or presumptions of fact ordinarily 
do not run backward. 
Also in 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 210 the rule is stated as 
follows: 
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"Retrospective Operation of Presumption. The 
presumption of the continued existence of a person, 
a personal relation, or a state of things is prospec-
tive and not retrospective. Such a presumption 
never runs backwards; the law does not presu1ne, 
from the proof of the existence of present condi-
tions or facts, that the same facts or conditions had 
existed for any length of time previously. Thus, 
proof of insanity at a particular time is not com-
petent to prove, on the principle of natural and 
probable relation, the same condition a consider-
able period prior thereto." (Italics Ours) 
In Russell, Poling C$ Co. v. Conners Standard Marine 
Corp. 252 F. 2d 167 (Second Circuit 1958) the Court 
held that proof that two channel buoys were out of posi-
tion the day after the plaintiff's barge was punctured by 
a sunken object, did not raise any presumption that the 
buoys were out of position on the day of the accident. 
When the buoys were found off position, they still were 
attached to their chains and anchors. No proof was of-
fered as to the actual cause of the moving of the buoys, 
but there was evidence that buoys were often moved by 
tugs whose tow lines foul the chain of the buoys and 
drag the buoys off position. The Court stated: 
uAppellants challenged the ruling of the Trial 
Court by asserting that a prior condition may be 
inferred from a state of facts subsequently estab-
lished. Generally, mere proof of the existence of 
a state of facts does not raise a presumption that 
the same condition of facts existed at a prior date, 
since inferences or presumptions of fact ordinarily 
do not run backward." 
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In Sloan v. Caroline Power and Light Co. 102 S. E. 
2d 822, (North Carolina 1958) the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina held that evidence of the clearance between 
telephone wires and power wires after the plaintiff's de-
cedent was electrocuted was not evidence of the distance 
of separation before the accident. The Court held: 
((Conceding that a factual situation once 
proven is presumed to continue in existence unless 
there is proof to the contrary, the existence of a 
condition at the time of an accident is not pre-
sumed to have existed prior thereto, and particular-
ly when the accident resulted from an operation 
that the evidence tends to show changed the condi-
tion and that such change was the proxmate cause 
of the injury or one of the proximate causes there-
of. Any inference or contention that the telephone 
wires were in the same location or condition before 
the accident as they were afterwards, must be 
predicated on evidence of such location or condi-
tion prior to the accident. The general rule in this 
·respect is stated in 31 C.J.S. Evidence Sec. 140, 
p. 789, as follows: (As a general rule mere proof 
of the existence of a present condition or state of 
facts or proof of the existence of a condition or 
state of facts at a given time, does not raise any 
presumption that the same condition or facts ex-
isted at a prior date, since inferences or presump-
tions of fact ordinaTily do not run backward.' 
Likewise, in the case of Liverpool & London & 
Globe Ins. Co. of Liverpool, England v. Nebraska 
Storage Warehouses, 8 Cir., 96 F. 2d 30, 36, it is 
said: ( ... that while a given condition, shown to 
exist at a given time, may be presumed to have 
continued, there is not, on the other hand, any 
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presumption that it existed previous to the time 
shown." 
Plaintiff cannot rely on a retrospective inference to 
prove defendant's negligence. As was stated in Sloan v. 
Carolina Power and Light Co. supra. 
((Negligence on the part of the defendant, as a 
general rule, is never presumed but is a matter for 
affirmative proof .... the presumption is in favor 
of innocence· or performance of duty and against 
the existence of negligence, and in the absence of 
affirmative proof it will be presumed that de-
fendant or his servants were not guilty of negli-
gence but exe·rcised due care with respect to the 
thing or condition which caused the accident." 
Plaintiff's witness who testified the stop sign was 
down during the last week in October corroborated the 
defendant's evidence to the effect that the stop sign was 
moved out of the working area during the day. This 
evidence does not raise an inference that the stop sign was 
not put up Friday night when defendant's crew left the 
area. 
The record clearly shows that defendant used reason-
able care in tttoe-nailing" the stop sign on the construction 
horse and placing it on the northwest corner of the in-
tersection. This was done on Friday evening, O·ctober 
28th. The plaintiff did not contend nor does the law 
require that the defendant place a guard at the construc-
tion site to see that signs are not removed. 
The defendant's construction crew did not return 
to Fillmore until Monday October 31st. On that morning 
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all of the signs. were returned to the construction area by 
some high school boys. There is no evidence in the record 
as to when the signs were taken down except that it was 
sometime after Friday evening, O~ctober 28th. 
There was no evidence from which the Court could 
find defendant negligent. The evidence in the record 
clearly shows that defendant used reasonable care in plac-
ing the stop sign on the Northwest corner of the inter-
section when its crew left the construction area. 
CONCLUSION 
The record conclusively shows that the defendant 
was not negligent. 
It is undisputed that on Friday evening October 28, 
1960, when defendant's construction crew left the job 
in Fillmore, the stop sign was ((toe-nailed" to a construc-
tion horse on the Northwest corner of the intersection of 
Highway U 100 and Second West. 
The absence of the stop sign on Saturday evening, 
October 29th was not a cause of the accident between the 
plaintiff and Verl Justesen. Justesen knew he was ap-
proaching a highway and saw the plaintiff's car. His 
reckless conduct in speeding into the intersection was the 
sole proximate cause of the accident. 
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The judgment of the lower court should be reversed 
and judgment entered for defendant as a matter of law, 
or defendant should have a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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